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The Analysis of Proper Names:
The Views of Pa∞inian Grammarians1
Émilie AUSSANT
Introduction
This paper is meant to give a presentation of three different analyses 
elaborated by Pa∞inian grammarians concerning the referential function-
ing of proper names. As far as I know, analyses of proper names under-
taken in the domain of Vyakara∞a—the classical Sanskrit grammar—
have never been studied before; most works concerning this topic have 
been done in the philosophy sphere (cf. Shaw 1985, Bhattacharya 1994, 
Ganeri 1995, 1996a, 1996b).
The key concept of the present study is the one of prav®tti-nimitta 
‘cause of application’. Deshpande, in his work titled The meaning of 
Nouns – Semantic Theory in Classical and Medieval India (1992, 56), 
defines it as follows:
It (i.e., the term prav®tti-nimitta) refers to a property whose posses-
sion by an entity is the necessary and sufficient condition for a given 
word being used to refer to that entity.
To a certain extent, this notion is very akin to what we call, in the 
Western tradition, connotation. I refer particularly to the term such as 
it has been used by Mill within his classification of nouns (1988, 
26-46) and to the interpretation of this use by the French linguist 
Kleiber (1981, 16):
Chez Mill, dénotation et connotation sont les deux rapports qui 
relient les noms aux choses. […] Avec G. A. Miller, on peut appeler 
1 This is the publication of a communication given on the occasion of the 13th World 
Sanskrit Conference (Vyakara∞a Panel), held in Edinburgh, Scotland, 10th-14th July 
2006. I thank Maria-Piera Candotti, Arlo Griffiths, Malhar A. Kulkarni, Peter 
M. Scharf and Vincenzo Vergiani for their remarks, criticisms and suggestions. The 
Indian authors and works which are quoted or mentioned in this paper are listed 
below. 
Onoma 45 (2010), 41-59. doi: 10.2143/ONO.45.0.2182815. © Onoma. All rights reserved.
95191_ONOMA_45_02.indd   41 29/11/12   14:43
42 ÉMILIE AUSSANT 
dénotation la définition en extension qui «  catalogue ou indique 
chaque objet que le symbole représente  ». La dénotation du mot 
cheval revient à nommer tous les individus pouvant être désignés par 
ce mot. La connotation, au contraire, est une «  définition en com-
préhension  » ou définition intensionnelle  : un nom général concret 
dénote et connote à la fois  ; il dénote les objets dans les conditions 
décrites ci-dessus et connote les attributs de ces objets. Blanc dénote 
tous les objets qui sont blancs et connote la qualité ‘blancheur’  ; 
cheval connote les attributs des êtres qu’il dénote, à savoir les traits 
‘mammifère’, ‘quadrupède’, etc.
I am inclined to think that the notions of cause of application and of 
connotation can be connected on the basis of their function. Both, 
indeed, explain why a given linguistic item refers to a given object and 
thus are opposed to the notions of artha ‘object’ and of denotation 
respectively, which concern that to which the item refers. There is a 
striking similarity, in fact, between the Indian conception according to 
which sukla (‘white’) denotes an object because this object is qualified 
by suklatva (‘whiteness’), on the one hand, and the Millian concep-
tion, reinterpreted by Kleiber (1981, 17-18),2 according to which white 
denotes all the objects which are white because it connotes the white-
ness quality, on the other.3
The notion of cause of application is fundamental in the context 
of this study because the three analyses of proper names which I am 
going to examine must be distinguished precisely at this level.
2 Mill distinguishes, in his classification of nouns, 1) connotative nouns, which 
denote one or several objects and imply, for these objects, one or several properties, 
2) non-connotative nouns, which denote a single object (ex. the proper name Paul) 
or an attribute (ex. the abstract noun whiteness). Now, as Kleiber notes (1981, 
17-18), if one can accept that white denotes and connotes, it is much more difficult 
to accept the idea according to which whiteness denotes without connoting (i.e., 
refers without having a semantic content). He says: “L’erreur de Mill, sur ce point, 
est de n’avoir pas vu que les noms dénotent, c’est-à-dire peuvent référer à des indi-
vidus particuliers, parce qu’ils connotent, c’est-à-dire parce qu’ils ont un sens. Cette 
considération lui aurait permis d’établir que la connotation de blancheur est sa déno-
tation. Nous proposons donc de remplacer la coordination dénotent ET connotent 
par la subordination dénotent, PARCE QU’ils connotent.” 
3 For a more detailed argument about this parallel, cf. Aussant 2009, 55-68. 
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1. Generic property as the cause of application of proper names
I will start with the presentation of the analysis according to which a 
generic property is the cause of application of proper names. The idea 
is that a name like Rama can be considered as a generic one in so far 
as it refers to a body which, from birth to death, goes through different 
states. Since the name Rama alone is used to designate the set of 
innumerable instances of this body which is never the same, one can-
not say that this name is an individual one. It can be only a generic 
name and then has ‘the fact of being Rama’ or ‘rama-hood’ (ramatva) 
as its cause of application.
This analysis of the semantico-referential functioning of proper 
names seems to be very well-known to the different Indian schools 
that have dealt with this topic. It is mentioned by logicians like Jag-
adisa (Sabdasaktiprakasika, karika 22-23 and v®tti, 117-124), by Bud-
dhists like SantarakÒita (Tattvasaμgraha, sloka 1226, 370) and 
Kamalasila (Pañjika, 370), and by specialists of poetry such as Jhalaki-
kar, author of the Balabodhini which is a commentary on Mamma†a’s 
Kavyaprakasa (Balabodhini, 37-38). Concerning the Pa∞inian gram-
matical tradition, one can find this analysis in Patañjali’s MahabhaÒya 
(M) as well as in Bhart®hari’s MahabhaÒyadipika (MD).
1.1. Patañjali’s MahabhaÒya
The generic property thesis is mentioned under the Varttika (V) 6 on 
the Pa∞inian rule no1.1.1:
anak®tiÌ // 
(V 6 ad A4 1.1.1, vol. 1, 167)
[A technical name is] devoid of class property.
athava(anak®tiÌ saμjña / ak®timantaÌ saμjñinaÌ / loke ’pi hy 
ak®timato maμsapi∞∂asya devadatta iti saμjña kriyate //5 
(M on V 6 ad A 1.1.1, vol. 1, 167)
Or [let us say that] the [technical] name (saμjña) is devoid of any 
class property (anakrtiÌ); it is its bearers (saμjñinaÌ) who share a 
4 A stands for AÒ†adhyayi (title of Pa∞ini’s grammar). 
5 ( and - (in translations) are used to make the reading easier. The first one sepa-
rates two sandhi-joined words and the second one two morphemes or two members 
of compound. 
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common property (ak®timantaÌ). In common usage also, the [proper] 
name (saμjña) Devadatta is given to the lump of flesh[-ball] pos-
sessing a class property (ak®timato).6
In this passage, the uniqueness of the name7 is opposed to the multi-
plicity of its referent which is the particular individual. Let us have a 
look at how commentators explain this idea of individual multiplicity 
with the Pradipa (P) of Kaiya†a first: 
ak®timanta iti / avasthabhedeÒv api sa eva(ayam iti pratyabhi-
jñanimittaμ devadattatvadikaμ samanyam asti(ity ak®timata ity 
uktam // 
(P on M on V 6 ad A 1.1.1, vol. 1, 168)
ak®timantaÌ – it is said: “possessing a class property”. [This signi-
fies that] the fact of being Devadatta etc. (devadattatva-adikaμ), is 
a general property (samanyam) which causes the recognition (praty-
abhijña°): “that is this same [Devadatta]” (sa eva(ayam iti), though 
[the particular individual is] considered at different life stages.
The recognition phenomenon (pratyabhijña) that is mentioned here, 
associates the direct perception, indicated by the use of the proximal 
deictic ayam ‘this’, to the memory, indicated by the use of the distal 
deictic tad ‘that’. As it is presented here, the existence of a general 
property (samanya) common to the manifold instances of a single 
entity allows the recognition phenomenon and explains that one can 
refer to that ever-changing entity by means of one and the same name.
This analysis assumes a special representation of the individual. 
The opposition between uniqueness of name and multiplicity of refer-
ent indicates that it is from the multiplicity of the individual that his 
unity is constructed, by abstraction.
Nagesa, in his Uddyota (U), comments on the same passage as 
follows: 
vastuto bhaÒya ak®timata ity asya bhedavata ity arthaÌ / avastha- 
bhedena ca tatra(aropitaÌ saÌ / aropitabhedena ca jatisattve na 
manam / ata eva devadatta(ity adau na niÒ iti kas cit // 
6 Units between square brackets are added to make the translation understandable. 
Those between brackets are either corresponding Sanskrit words or personal com-
ments. 
7 Note that, in the grammatical domain, saμjña mainly denotes technical terms, 
proper names and autonyms. Cf. Aussant 2009, 17-23.  
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(U on P on M on V 6 ad A 1.1.1, vol. 1, 168)
Someone [says]: actually, the meaning of ak®timataÌ in the BhaÒya 
is ‘that which possesses self varieties (asya bhedavata)’. And that 
[self variety] is superimposed (aropitaÌ) on that [single individual 
Devadatta] because of the diversity of life stages. And that superim-
posed variety (aropita-bhedena) does not prove the existence of a 
generic property (jati°). This is why there is no niÒ suffix8 in 
devadatta etc.
This commentary is interesting in so far as Nagesa relates a point of 
view which differs from the one exposed in the MahabhaÒya and com-
mented on in the Pradipa: according to the view reported by Nagesa, 
the particular individual who bears the name Devadatta does not con-
stitute a gender, for his multiplicity is not inherent in him, it is solely 
superimposed. 
1.2. Bhart®hari’s MahabhaÒyadipika
Bhart®hari mentions the thesis of a generic property as the cause of 
application of proper names in the following extract of the Mahab-
haÒyadipika:
yatha bhrama∞atvam anekakarmaviÒayaμ bhrama∞am ity ucyate / 
evaμ ∂itthe ’pi yadutpattiprabh®tya vinasad eva tad bhavaty ayaμ 
∂ittho ’yaμ ∂ittha iti / balyakaumarayauvanasthavireÒv abhinnaÌ 
sa eva(ayam iti saμpratyayaÌ sa ak®tiÌ sabdavacya / […] / tasmat 
samanyam atra(apy asti / 
(MD on Paspasa,9 1987, 15)
Just as the fact of turning (bhrama∞atvam), which concerns manifold 
actions, is called bhrama∞am (‘turning’), so in the case of [the indi-
vidual named] Δittha, [there is something] which evolves from birth 
to death, [that’s why] one says “this is Δittha, this [again] is Δittha”. 
The conviction, [expressed by the sentence:] “this is the same 
[Δittha]” (sa eva(ayam iti), that [this Δittha remains] unchanged 
[through] childhood, early youth, maturity and old age [is provided 
8 Required by jater astri-viÒayad aya-upadhat // (A 4.1.63) “[The niÒ suffix is intro-
duced] after a generic [nominal stem] which is not feminine by origin and does not 
contain the phoneme y as penultimate [to derive a feminine stem].” If devadatta 
were a generic term, the feminine form would be *devadatti but it is the form 
devadatta which is attested. 
9 Paspasa is the name of MahabhaÒya’s introduction (first ahnika). 
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by] the class property (ak®tiÌ), which is expressed by the word 
(sabda-vacya). […]. That’s why there is a general property (saman-
yam) in that case also.
In this passage, Bhart®hari’s words are unequivocal: proper names are 
generic terms. If it is possible to refer to an individual, who is still 
changing from birth to death, by means of one and the same name, it 
is because the name signifies the generic property of the individual.
2.  The own form (sva-rupa) as the cause of application of proper 
names
I will now present the thesis of the own form of the name (sva-rupa) 
as its cause of application. This thesis seems to have been mentioned 
for the first time by Bhart®hari. It has been also defended by Kaiya†a.
2.1. Bhart®hari’s MahabhaÒyadipika and Vakyapadiya
The passage of the MahabhaÒyadipika is the following:
yad®cchasaktijanukara∞aplutyadyarthaÌ / […] / yad®ccha nama / 
ya(asati prav®ttinimitte ’rthagataμ pravartakaμ nivartakaμ va 
niyamahetum antare∞a pravartate nivartate va sa yad®ccha / 
∂itthasabdo hi svarupamatranibandhano yatra yatra prayujyate 
idaμ tavad asya namadheyaμ karomi(iti tatra tatra nivartate / 
(MD on M on V 1 ad A ®¬K, 1988, 11-12)
yad®cchasaktijanukara∞aplutyadyarthaÌ – […] yad®ccha: a name 
(nama). That which applies or does not apply [to its object] in the 
absence of a limitative cause (niyama-hetum), [that is] in the absence 
of a cause of application (prav®tti-nimitte) pertaining to the object 
(artha-gatam), [a cause of application] which motivates or prevents 
[the application of the word], is an arbitrary [name] (yad®ccha). The 
word ∂ittha (∂ittha-sabdo), indeed, which is based on its mere own 
form (sva-rupa-matra-nibandhano), refers to whomever/whatever 
(yatra yatra) I make it the name of (nama-dheyaμ karomi) [and] 
does not refer to anyone/anything else (tatra tatra nivartate).
As far as I know, it is in this passage that for the first time in the 
Pa∞inian tradition one finds an occurrence of the expression prav®tti-
nimitta.10 But it is also the only occurrence that I have noted in both 
10 Patañjali only uses prav®tti. 
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of Bhart®hari’s texts. He actually uses the expression sva-rupa(matra)
nibandhana ‘which has its (mere) own form as its basis’ much more 
frequently, an expression which can be considered as a synonym of 
sva-rupa-prav®tti-nimitta.11 So, according to this passage, arbitrary 
names such as Δittha have their own form as their cause of applica-
tion. But it is equally true in the case of words whose etymology is 
quite well-known, as the following stanza of the Vakyapadiya (VP) 
shows:
agnisomadayaÌ sabda ye svarupanibandhanaÌ /
saμjñibhiÌ saμprayujyante ’prasiddhes teÒu gau∞ata // 
(VP II.281, 84) 
Words (sabda) such as agni, soma etc.12 which have their own form 
as their basis (sva-rupa-nibandhanaÌ),13 are used in connection with 
some name-bearers (saμjñibhiÌ); since [their use in relation to these 
name-bearers] is not established, there is a secondary [use of these 
names] (gau∞ata) in relation to these [name-bearers].
This stanza is concerned with words such as agni and soma used as 
names for people. Because this kind of usage is not well-established, 
it is regarded as secondary (gau∞ata). Like the proper name Δittha, 
they connote their own form (sva-rupa-nibandhanaÌ) and denote a 
particular bearer (saμjñin).
2.2. Kaiya†a’s Pradipa
Several passages of the Pradipa14 could be quoted to illustrate the the-
sis of the own form as the cause of application; the passage selected 
here as well as its context happen to be of great interest for our purpose. 
11 For a detailed explanation, cf. Aussant 2009, 86, n. 7. 
12 agni denotes the fire element as well as the Fire deity; soma denotes the juice of 
a plant used in Vedic rituals as well as the divine personification of this juice/plant. 
13 In Rau’s edition (as well as in Hinüber’s), one reads: agnisomadayaÌ sabda ye 
svarupapadarthakaÌ […]. According to this version, the words agni and soma, used 
as proper names, would denote (pada-arthakaÌ) their own form (sva-rupa) [agni] 
and [soma] respectively, as if they were autonyms. But it is not the case: as proper 
names, the words agni and soma connote their own form and denote the boys thus 
named. Peter M. Scharf kindly indicated me the different reading found in the ver-
sion of Raghunatha Sharma’s edition (which is followed here). 
14 Cf. especially: P on M on V 1 ad A ®¬K, vol. 1, 99; P on M on V 2 ad A ®¬K, 
vol. 1, 102-103; P on M on A 1.1.1, vol. 1, 159; P on M on V 6 ad A 1.1.27, vol. 1, 
329. 
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Here is the passage of the MahabhaÒya commented upon:
∂itthadiÒu tarhi vartyabhavad v®ttir na prapnoti / ∂itthatvaμ ∂itthata 
∂ambhi††atvam iti / atra(api kas cit prathamakalpiko ∂ittho 
∂ambhi††as ca tena k®taμ kriyaμ gu∞aμ va yaÌ kas cit karoti sa uc- 
yate ∂itthatvaμ ta eta∂ ∂ambhi††atvaμ ta etat / evaμ ∂itthaÌ kurvanty 
evaμ ∂ambhi††aÌ kurvanti // yas tarhi prathamakalpiko ∂ittho 
∂ambhi††as ca tasya vartyabhavad v®ttir na prapnoti / na(eÒa doÒaÌ 
/ yatha(eva tasya kathaμcitkaÌ prayoga evaμ v®ttir api bhaviÒyati / 
(M on V 5 ad A 5.1.119, vol. 4, 348)
In the case of ∂ittha etc., the use [of the bhava suffix] is not realised 
because no [characteristic feature] resides [in this substratum]. 
– [However one finds the following terms:] ∂itthatva (‘fact of being 
Δittha’), ∂itthata (idem), ∂ambhi††atva (‘fact of being Δambhi††a’). 
In this case also [the use of the bhava suffix is realised]: there was, 
[at the very beginning of time] a first [individual named] Δittha and 
[a first individual named] Δambhi††a. This [first Δittha, this first 
Δambhi††a] performed an action (kriyaμ) or possessed a quality 
(gu∞aμ) and one will say about an individual [named Δittha or 
Δambhi††a today] who performs [the same action or who possesses 
the same quality as the first Δittha or Δambhi††a]: this (this action 
or this quality) is your ∂itthatva, this is your ∂ambhi††atva. The 
[individuals named] Δittha act in this way, the [individuals named] 
Δambhi††a act in this way. 
– [But] in the case of the first Δittha or of [the first] Δambhi††a 
[who lived at the very beginning of time], the use [of the bhava suf-
fix] is not realised because no [characteristic feature] resides [in this 
substratum]. 
– There is no such a defect. This [name Δittha or Δambhi††a] is 
used somehow; the use [of the bhava suffix] will also be realised in 
the same way.
Before examining Kaiya†a’s Pradipa, I would like to make a few 
observations on this extract of the MahabhaÒya. The problem men-
tioned here consists in explaining the existence of such forms as 
∂itthatva, that is to say derivatives composed of a proper name and an 
abstract suffix called “bhava suffix”. A suffix such as -tva refers to 
the essence of a thing, to its bhava.15 In the case of a generic term such 
15 On the notion of bhava, cf. Filliozat 1998. 
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as go ‘cow’, for example, one can form the derivative gotva which 
signifies the ‘fact of being a cow’ or ‘cowness’. Likewise, in the case 
of a quality name such as sukla ‘white’, one can form the derivative 
suklatva ‘fact of being white/whiteness’. These two examples show 
that the essence of things constitutes the cause of application of the 
terms that denote them: sukla will be used in relationship with such 
object because of its suklatva ‘whiteness’, likewise, the word go will 
be used in relationship with such animal because of its gotva ‘cow-
ness’. It seems then that the suffix -tva refers to the cause of applica-
tion of the lexical base to which it is added. The case of items such as 
∂itthatva is problematic since the base does not have the essence of 
the object to which it refers as its cause of application. In this case, 
how to explain the use of the suffix -tva?
The first solution proposed in the MahabhaÒya to justify the existence 
of forms such as ∂itthatva consists in considering that at the beginning 
there was an individual who was the initial bearer of the name Δittha. 
Let us assume that this individual was particularly thoughtful and that 
this quality constituted one of his essential characteristics. If, after 
him, one observes that some other individuals named Δittha possess 
thoughtfulness as well, this typical quality of Δittha’s becomes closely 
associated to the name itself and becomes its semantic content, as it 
were. Thus one will say about an individual named Δittha who appears 
to be thoughtful as well: “this is really a Δittha”. Thoughtfulness in 
fact becomes the cause of application of the name Δittha. In this con-
text, the ∂itthatva is a quality (here, thoughtfulness) or a characteristic 
activity of the bearer of the name Δittha. 
This analysis of the functioning of the name which is, at the beginning, 
assigned to a single individual and in the end designates a class con-
structed from the properties of the initially designated individual is 
diametrically opposed to the analysis which is the basis of the generic 
property thesis previously mentioned. Whereas in the first analysis one 
started from the multiplicity of the individual to construct its unity by 
abstraction, in the present analysis it is the individual conceived as a 
unity which constitutes the starting point and which allows to con-
struct, from its properties, a class of individuals. One point however 
needs to be highlighted: in the context of the first thesis, the multiplic-
ity is internal (one and the same individual is in question); in the 
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context of the second thesis, the multiplicity is external (the initial 
bearer of the name is ontologically distinct from the other bearers).16 
Each of these analyses therefore gives a special representation of the 
individual which makes clear that the latter is not at all a mere entity 
still identical to himself.17
To this first solution proposed to justify items such as ∂itthatva, 
the following objection is made: in the case of the first individual 
named Δittha, one cannot invoke the action made by or the quality 
possessed by a previous Δittha. Then a second solution is proposed 
which seems to be the final one in so far as it closes the discussion: 
because names such as Δittha etc. cannot be used without a cause of 
application, one is compelled to assume that something else plays this 
role as much in the case of the initial bearer as in that of subsequent 
bearers. This something else is not explicitly named. Let us have a 
look at the commentaries.
Kaiya†a comments as follows:
∂itthadiÒv iti / ∂itthadayo yad®cchasabda arthagataμ na kiμ cit 
prav®ttinimittam apekÒante puruÒecchavasena pravartanat / […] / sab-
dasvarupam arthe ’dhyasya(ayaμ ∂ittha iti saμjñasaμjñisambandhaÌ 
kriyate / tataÌ sabdasvarupasangad yatha ∂itthasabdasya(arthe 
prayogas tatha(eva sabdasvarupe ’rthe ’dhyaste pratyayaÌ ity arthaÌ / 
(P on M on V 5 ad A 5.1.119, vol. 4, 348-349)
∂itthadiÒu – arbitrary words (yad®ccha-sabda) such as ∂ittha etc. do 
not depend on any cause of application (prav®tti-nimittam) pertain-
ing to the object (artha-gataμ) in so far as [these words] come into 
use because of the free choice of the speaker (puruÒa-iccha-ava-
sena). […] Having superimposed (adhyasya) the own form of the 
word (sabda-sva-rupam) on the object (arthe), the name–named 
relationship (saμjña-saμjñi-sambandhaÌ) is instituted [by the utter-
ance:] “this is Δittha”. The meaning is: thus, because of the con-
nection with the own form of the word (sabda-sva-rupa-asangad) 
16 When one says “this is a Devadatta” one assumes that the individual spoken of 
is not precisely Devadatta, it is someone who is like the initial bearer of the name 
Devadatta because of this or that quality or this or that activity. 
17 The French linguist Gary-Prieur (1996), basing herself on a study of the use of 
proper names in French, shows how these two representations of the individual exist 
in the French language as well. 
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[of the individual name bearer], just as the word ∂ittha is used in 
relation to [such] object (arthe), so the suffix is used for the own 
form of the word (sabda-sva-rupe) which is superimposed (adhyaste) 
on the object (arthe).
In order to explain the existence of forms such as ∂itthatva, Kaiya†a 
defends the following thesis: the cause of application of a term such 
as ∂ittha is the own form of the word which is (mentally) superim-
posed on the particular individual denoted. And this thesis allows the 
functioning of the proper name to be explained even in the case of the 
very first individual named Δittha. In the context of this thesis, the 
-tva suffix of ∂itthatva is used in relationship to the own form of the 
word, which is the cause of the word’s application.
The later commentaries of Annaμbha††a (Uddyotana, Una) and 
Naraya∞a Sastri (Naraya∞iya, N) confirm this interpretation: 
saμjñasabdeÒu saμjña(eva prav®ttinimittaμ devadatta ity ukte 
devadattasaμjñaka iti pratiteÌ / tato ca(arthe aropitasvarupani- 
mittako yad®cchasabda ity arthaÌ / 
(Una on P on M on V 1 ad A ®¬K, vol. 1, 137)
The meaning is: in the case of words called saμjña, the cause of 
application (prav®tti-nimittaμ) is the name itself (saμjña(eva) since 
when devadatta is uttered [one understands: “person] named 
Devadatta” (devadatta-saμjñaka). And that is why an arbitrary 
word (yad®ccha-sabda) has its own form (°sva-rupa°) which is 
superimposed (aropita°) on the object (arthe) as its cause [of appli-
cation] (°nimittako).
arthagatam iti / jatigu∞akriyadravyasaμbandharupam arthagatani-
mittam anad®tya(artharopitasvarupanimittakataya saμjñasabdaprav®ttir 
ity arthaÌ / 
(N on P on M on V 1 ad A ®¬K, vol. 1, 139)
arthagatam – the meaning is: the application of a word called 
saμjña [is done] by means of the cause (°nimittakataya) which is its 
own form (°sva-rupa°) superimposed (°aropita°) on the object 
(artha°), without consideration for any cause [of application] (°ni-
mittam) pertaining to the object (artha-gata°) whether it be a generic 
property (jati°), a quality (°gu∞a°), an action (°kriya°), an individual 
(°dravya°) or a relation (°saμbandha°).
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This thesis of the own form as the cause of application is particularly 
interesting because it lays stress on the reflexive dimension of proper 
names, that is to say, on the fact that they reflect a part of themselves. 
I am indeed inclined to think that when such grammarians such as 
Bhart®hari and Kaiya†a state that some terms have their own form as 
their cause of application, we are very close to the idea according to 
which some terms signify their phonological shape. This conception 
of proper names as signifying a part of themselves has been defended 
by contemporary linguists such as Rey-Debove (1997, 270 and fol-
lowing) and Kleiber (1981, 385 and following). I will not explain their 
analyses in detail. I would just like to underline the major role attrib-
uted to the signifiant of proper names by some language specialists of 
different times and cultures.
3. The individual as the cause of application of proper names
I will close this paper with the presentation of the thesis according to 
which the particular individual is the cause of application of the name. 
As far as I know, this thesis seems to have been defended, in the gram-
matical domain, only by Nagesa.
Here is the passage of the MahabhaÒya commented upon: 
catuÒ†hayi sabdanaμ prav®ttiÌ / jatisabda gu∞asabdaÌ kriyasabda 
yad®cchasabdas caturthaÌ // 
(M on V 1 ad A ®¬K, vol. 1, 99) 
The application (prav®ttiÌ) of words (sabdanaμ) is quadripartite: 
[there are] generic terms (jati-sabda), quality words (gu∞a-sabdaÌ) 
[and] action words (kriya-sabda); arbitrary words (yad®ccha-sabdas) 
[are the] fourth [type].
This is commented upon in the Pradipa as follows:
yad®ccha(iti / arthagataμ prav®ttinimittam anapekÒya yaÌ sabdaÌ 
prayoktrabhipraye∞a(eva pravartate sa yad®cchasabdo ∂itthadiÌ // 
(P on M on V 1 ad A ®¬K, vol. 1, 99) 
yad®ccha – A word (sabdaÌ) which applies only according to the 
intention of the speaker (prayoktr-abhipraye∞a(eva), without being 
dependent on any cause of application (prav®tti-nimittam) pertaining 
to the object (artha-gataμ), is an arbitrary word (yad®ccha-sabdo) 
such as ∂ittha, etc.
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Here is the relevant passage of the Uddyota:
arthagatam iti / sabdatiriktam artharupam ity arthaÌ / yad va vyakter 
eva vacyata / tasyaμ ca prakarataviseÒyatakhyaviÒayatadvayangi- 
karac chaktigrahopapattiÌ savikalpakopapattis ca tata iti bhavaÌ / 
prayoktrabhipraye∞a(eva(iti / saktibodhanaμ prayoktradhinam iti 
bhavaÌ / anyatha sabdarthasaμbandhasya(anityatapattiÌ / evaμ ca 
svecchaya(ekasyaμ vyaktau saμketyamanaÌ sabdo yad®cchasabda 
iti bodhyam / […] / tatra yad®cchasabdo nama vaktra svecchaya 
saμnivesitaÌ / sa ca(anekavidhaÌ ekavyaktisaμnivesito ∂itthadir 
ekaÌ / tatra na kiμcidatiriktaμ prav®ttinimittam anantyavyabhi- 
carayor abhavat / kiμ tu sakyasya(eva(arthasya viÒayatadvayena 
bhanam / taduttaratvadeÌ prakaratvavachinnaÌ sa eva(arthaÌ / 
(U on P on M on V 1 ad A ®lK, vol. 1, 99-100)
arthagatam – the meaning is: [without taking into account the cause 
of application] which consists in an object (artha°) other than the 
form (sabda°) [of the word]. Or the individual (vyakter) itself is 
expressed (vacyata). The idea is: by accepting that the two proper-
ties of objecthood (°viÒayata°), called ‘property to determinate’ 
(prakarata°) and ‘property of being determined’ (°viseÒyata°), are 
located in the [individual], it is possible to understand the expressive 
capacity (chakti°) [of the word] and consequently it is possible to 
get a differentiated cognition (savikalpaka°). prayoktrabhipraye∞a(eva 
– the idea is: making known the expressive capacity (sakti°) [of the 
word] depends on the speaker (prayoktr°). Otherwise, the word 
(sabda°), the object (°artha°) and their relationship (°saμbandhasya) 
would become non-eternal. Thus one has to understand that an arbi-
trary word (yad®ccha-sabda) is a word conventionally assigned to 
(saμketyamanaÌ) [the designation of] an individual (vyaktau) 
according to the desire [of the speaker]. […] Then an arbitrary word 
(yad®ccha-sabdo) is applied by the speaker (vaktra) according to his 
own desire (sva-icchaya). [These arbitrary words are] of several 
kinds: ∂ittha etc. which is applied to a single individual (°vyakti°), 
is one of them. In this case, the cause of application (prav®tti-
nimittam) [of the word ∂ittha] is none other than this [single indi-
vidual] because there is no infinite regress (anantya°) and because 
there is no transgression (°vyabhicarayor).18 Rather, the determined 
18 The two notions of anantya and vyabhicara contradict the particularist thesis 
according to which the object of words is a particular. According to the first notion, 
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object appears with the two properties of objecthood (viÒayata°). 
The meaning of the [suffix] -tva etc. [added] to this [word] is the 
[individual] himself considered as qualificand (prakaratva°).19
Here20 Nagesa expounds his own conception of the semantico-referen-
tial functioning of individual proper names: a name such as Δittha has 
the individual himself both as its object and as its cause of application.
Conclusion
If one accepts the idea mentioned in the introduction according to 
which the cause of application of a word is its connotation, one can 
say that for the grammarians quoted here the individual proper name 
denotes BECAUSE it connotes. In other words, the proper name does 
not directly denote the individual entity (as some Neo-logicians would 
say, using the expression s®ngagrahika);21 for the grammarians, the 
referential process takes place by virtue of connotation.
Abbreviations
a AÒ†adhyayi
M MahabhaÒya
MD MahabhaÒyadipika
N Naraya∞iya
P Pradipa
U Uddyota
Una Uddyotana
VP Vakyapadiya
V Varttika
one cannot say that go refers to a single cow for the number of cows is infinite and 
infinity of teachings would be necessary to know the meaning/object of go. Accord-
ing to the second notion, if the meaning/object of the word go consists only in a 
single individual without any reference to cowness, the word go will be assigned to 
individuals of different species. On the one hand, go does not refer to all the indi-
viduals that it would have to designate and, on the other, it can refer to individuals 
that it should not designate. On this topic, cf. especially Filliozat 1975, 200, n. 1, 
and Ganeri 1995, 411-412. 
19 For a detailed explanation of this passage, cf. Aussant 2009, 129-133. 
20 Nagesa expounds his thesis in another passage of the Uddyota: U on P on M on 
V 6 ad A 5.1.119, vol. 4, 350-351. Cf. Aussant 2009, 133-134.  
21 Cf. Aussant 2009, 113-126. 
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List of authors and works mentioned
author date work
Pa∞ini 5th c. B.C.? AÒ†adhyayi (‘The Eight Chapters’)
Grammatical treatise providing the 
generation of correct Sanskrit forms; basic 
text of the Pa∞inian school, composed in 
sutras (‘aphorisms’)
Katyayana 3rd c. B.C. Varttika (‘Remarks on the procedure’)
Commentary on a part of Pa∞inian’s sutras
Patañjali 2nd c. B.C. MahabhaÒya (‘The Great Commentary’)
Commentary on Katyayana’s Varttikas
Bhart®hari 5th c. A.D. Vakyapadiya (‘Work Dealing with Sentences 
and Words’)
Treatise of grammatical philosophy
MahabhaÒyadipika (‘Light on the Great 
Commentary’)
Incomplete commentary on Patañjali’s 
MahabhaÒya
SantarakÒita 8th c. A.D. Tattvasaμgraha (‘Compendium of Reality’)
Survey of Buddhist and non-Buddhist 
philosophical systems
Kamalasila 8th c. A.D. Tattvasaμgrahapañjika (‘Commentary on the 
Compendium of Reality’)
Commentary on SantarakÒita’s 
Tattvasaμgraha
Kaiya†a 11th c. A.D. Pradipa (‘Lamp [of the Great Commentary]’)
Complete commentary on Patañjali’s 
MahabhaÒya
Jagadisa 16th c. A.D. Sabdasaktiprakasika (‘Sun of Words’ 
Capacity to Express’)
Work on New Logic
Jhalakikar 17th c. A.D.? Balabodhini (‘Instruction for Children’)
Commentary on Mamma†a’s Kavyaprakasa, 
a poetical treatise from the 11th c. A.D.
Naraya∞a Sastri 17th c. A.D. Naraya∞iya (‘Naraya∞a’s [Commentary]’)
Complete commentary on Kaiya†a’s Pradipa
Annaμbha††a 17th c. A.D. Uddyotana (‘Illumination [of the Lamp of 
the Great Commentary]’)
Complete commentary on Kaiya†a’s Pradipa
Nagesa 17th-18th c. A.D. Uddyota (‘Light [of the Lamp of the Great 
Commentary]’)
Complete commentary on Kaiya†a’s Pradipa
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Summary: The Analysis of Proper Names: The Views of Pa∞inian 
Grammarians
This paper attempts to give a presentation of the different analyses which have 
been elaborated by Indian grammarians of the Pa∞inian school concerning the 
referential functioning of proper names. After having defined the central 
notion of ‘cause of application’ (prav®tti-nimitta), I will review three theses: 
1) the thesis of generic property (ak®ti, samanya, jati) as the cause of applica-
tion of proper names; 2) the thesis of the own form (sva-rupa) as the cause of 
application of proper names; 3) the thesis of the individual (vyakti) as the 
cause of application of proper names. I will take the opportunity to show what 
kind of representation of the human individual these analyses involve.
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Résumé∞∞: L’analyse des noms propres∞∞: les points de vue des grammairiens 
pa∞inéens
L’article tente de présenter les différentes analyses élaborées par les grammai-
riens indiens de l’école pa∞inéenne au sujet du fonctionnement référentiel des 
noms propres. Après avoir défini la notion centrale de «∞∞cause d’application∞∞» 
(prav®tti-nimitta), je passerai en revue trois thèses  :1) la thèse de la propriété 
générique comme cause d’application du nom propre (ak®ti, samanya, jati)∞∞; 
2) celle de la forme propre (sva-rupa)∞∞; 3) celle de l’individu (vyakti). Je pro-
fiterai de l’occasion pour montrer quel type de représentation de la personne 
humaine est impliqué par ces analyses.
Zusammenfassung: Die Analyse von Eigennamen: Die Sichtweisen der 
Pa∞ini-Grammatiker 
Der Artikel versucht, die verschiedenen Analysen über die referentielle Funk-
tion von Eigennamen vorzustellen, die von indischen Grammatikern der 
Pa∞ini-Schule erarbeitet wurden. Nach der Definition des zentralen Begriffs 
der “Anwendungsursache” (prav®tti-nimitta) werden drei Thesen besprochen: 
1) die These der generischen Eigenschaft (ak®ti, samanya, jati) als Benen-
nungsursache; 2) die These von der eigenen Form (sva-rupa) und schließlich 
3) die These vom Individuum (vyakti) als Anlass für die Vergabe von Eigen-
namen. Ich möchte die Gelegenheit wahrnehmen und aufzeigen, welche Dar-
stellungsweisen des menschlichen Individuums sich aus diesen Analysen erge-
ben.
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